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CASE COMMENT – WEBSTER V BURTON HOSPITAL NHS FOUNDATION TRUST 
THE FACTS 
On 13 February 2017, the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in Webster v 
Burton Hospital NHS Foundation Trust.1 The appellant is a 14 year old boy – represented 
by his mother – who was born in 2003 with cerebral palsy, suffering physical and 
cognitive impairment. It is uncontested that these disabilities occurred 2-3 days prior to 
his birth and could have been avoided by an earlier delivery. The disabilities were caused 
by a short period of cord compression, that, had it lasted longer, would have resulted in 
his death. Initially the pregnancy – the mother’s first – was uncomplicated, the scan at 
20 weeks was within normal limits but showed a low-lying placenta, and a note was 
made to have another scan at week 34. The following scan assuaged the concerns 
regarding the position of the placenta but revealed other concerns: the foetus was small 
for its gestational age and there was an asymmetry between the head circumference and 
the abdominal circumference. Moreover, there was an excess in amniotic fluid. A further 
note was made to have a review after 41 weeks with a view to induction, as was 
recommended by the relevant guidelines.2 However, the treating Obstetrician and 
Gynaecologist, Mr Hollingworth, did not note the smallness of the foetus, the recorded 
asymmetry or the excess of amniotic fluid, but treated the pregnancy as being without 
these anomalies. There is no doubt that the doctor had acted negligently in not 
arranging further ultrasound scanning based on the foetus being small for gestational 
age.3 A day before the expected delivery, on 26 December 2002, Ms Butler went into 
hospital feeling unwell. The next day she was seen by Mr Hollingworth, who recorded 
that she felt well. According to Ms Butler’s evidence she did indeed feel a little better but 
assumed that labour would be induced based on her feeling unwell and it being her due 
date. This was, however, not the case and instead Ms Butler was induced on 07 January 
2003, which led to the birth of the appellant.  
The claim and the appeal rested on the decisions taken on 27 December 2002 with the 
appellant claiming that labour should have been induced which would have avoided the 
appellant’s brain damage. The respondent argued that, had two further ultrasounds not 
been omitted, they would have provided reassurance and that the results would not 
have given rise to inducing labour early.     
The main issue that the court had to address was the question of whether the treating 
physician should have informed himself, and subsequently the appellant’s mother, about 
possible risks arising from the continuing of the pregnancy, giving Ms Butler the chance 
to request an earlier induction. While breach of duty had been admitted, the question 
was one of causation.  
HIGH COURT 
In the High Court judgment of 28 November 2014 giving rise to this appeal, Inglis J 
assumed that had Ms Butler known of the increased risks she would have requested an 
earlier induction.4 He also found that Mr Hollingworth had acted negligently in 
categorising the November scan as normal, thus preventing further fortnightly scans.5 Mr 
Hollingworth had focussed on the Doppler reading (the ultrasound of foetal bloodflow) 
which led him to conclude that there was no placental problem and consequently no 
need for further fortnightly scans.6 The question was whether he should have realised 
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this combination of symptoms to be problematic. Inglis J noted that Mr Holligworth 
should have informed himself about the implications of the symptoms, instead of 
ignoring them.7 According to an expert called by the claimant, waiting for the pregnancy 
to run its full course was unusual and not justified, as an earlier induction would have 
reduced the risks associated with the symptoms.8 Yet, the expert called by the 
respondent disagreed and sided with Mr Hollingworth that no importance had to be 
attached to the combinations of symptoms.9 Inglis J concluded that a discussion between 
Mr Hollingworth and Ms Butler about the risks and possible courses of action would have 
been required had he changed from the usual course of action, for example if he had 
commissioned further scans. However, since he had proceeded with the course of action 
already underway, no discussion with Ms Butler had been required.10 
The treating physician hence was found to not have acted negligently in letting the 
pregnancy continue without an earlier induction. 
COURT OF APPEAL 
After recalling the most important points made by Inglis J in the High Court Simon LJ 
turned his attention to Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, which had changed the 
previously held approach towards the duty of physicians to advise their patients.11 This 
Supreme Court judgment formally put an end to the previously established approach 
derived from Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee,12 according to which a 
doctor could not be held to have been acting negligently if she acted “in accordance with 
a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that 
particular art”.13 The Supreme Court disagreed with that approach, as “social and legal 
developments which we have mentioned point away from a model of the relationship 
between the doctor and the patient based upon medical paternalism”.14 Patients should 
be treated as capable adults who understand that medical treatment might involve risks 
and that success of treatment is not certain.15 This includes a duty on the side of the 
physician to inform the patient of possible risks of injury, “but it is also the counterpart 
of the patient's entitlement to decide whether or not to incur that risk”.16 According to 
the Supreme Court, the patient has a right to decide what risks to her health she is 
willing to take.17 In order to be able to do this, the doctor has to inform the patient of 
any material risks. “The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the 
particular case, a reasonable person in the patient's position would be likely to attach 
significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular 
patient would be likely to attach significance to it”.18 While a patient “cannot force her 
doctor to offer treatment which he or she considers futile or inappropriate … she is at 
least entitled to the information which will enable her to take a proper part in that 
decision”.19 
In light of Montgomery the appellant claimed that the issue was not whether a 
reasonable body of medical opinion supported a particular course of action, but what 
information and advice the mother should have been given. Ms Butler claimed that, had 
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she been given the full information about the foetal development, she would have 
requested an induction on 27 December instead of waiting. The respondent, on the other 
hand, argued that there was no reason to change the course of action.  
The Court of Appeal accepted the appellant’s argument that, following Montgomery, the 
Bolam approach was no longer the correct one.20 As the High Court had followed the out-
dated Bolam approach, the Court of Appeal in a unanimous decision reversed the 
judgment.21 Following Montgomery, the doctor is to present the patient with the material 
risks and uncertainties of different treatments, thus enabling the patient to make an 
informed choice about her health and treatment.22 This was something Mr Hollingworth 
had failed to do, as he neither informed himself nor Ms Butler about the implications of 
the conditions of her pregnancy.23 According to the Court of Appeal, Mr Hollingworth 
would have had to inform himself about the combination of symptoms present in Ms 
Butler’s pregnancy, compiling “a list of anomalies and complications which could not be 
avoided by earlier delivery, but also the increased risk of perinatal (the period around 
birth) mortality, including ante partum (before delivery) mortality, based on a very small 
statistical base”.24 The Court reached its conclusion based on two academic papers 
regarding the pregnancy’s symptoms, which point to “an emerging but recent ad 
incomplete material showing increased risk of delaying labour in cases with this 
combination of features”.25  
 
COMMENTARY 
A final farewell to Bolam 
At last, the patient has come of age. Starting with Bolam, slowly maturing via Sidaway,26 
Bolitho,27 Pearce28 and Montgomery, the law has determined that the patient now is 
reasonable enough to be confronted with risks and uncertainties, to then make her own, 
informed decision. It was a slow maturing process, and one would wish to now lean 
back, relax and be satisfied that at long last the law is fit for purpose in acknowledging 
and respecting the patient’s autonomy and individual needs. However, we should not 
celebrate prematurely. While our first impulse might be that this is exactly what we have 
been waiting for, there are still some concerns that we should not overlook.  
First, let us briefly go back to the beginning of this maturing process. In Bolam, the 
principle was established that a doctor was not acting negligently if he acted in 
accordance with “a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art”.29 
While seeming reasonable at first, this test was criticised for giving too much deference 
to the opinion of a medical body testifying on behalf of the defendant doctor.30 As long 
as the defendant could point to one body of medical opinion supporting his choice of 
treatment, he could avoid liability for negligence.31 Almost thirty years later, Sidaway 
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added the requirement that medical actions and disclosures had to be judged in 
accordance with professional standards.32 While Sidaway is not a straightforward 
judgment in that the different judges use different approaches regarding the materiality 
of risk,33 we can see a move away from the strictly doctor-centred approach of Bolam. In 
1998, Bolitho developed the Bolam test further by requiring that the benefits of a 
specific treatment had to be weighed against the risks.34 Additionally, it now was for the 
courts to evaluate the treatment received, not the physicians themselves.35 Shortly after 
Bolitho, in Pearce, Lord Woolf MR suggested the notion of a reasonable patient,36 and a 
meagre 16 years later Montgomery presented us with a duty to inform the patient of 
risks and possible injuries relating to a condition or treatment that that particular patient 
would want to be informed of.37 Webster added to Montgomery, that the patient also has 
to be presented with uncertainties, not just risks. This broadens the requirement put on 
the treating physician, as uncertainties are arguably vaguer than risks and possible 
injuries. “Virtually every decision a clinician makes has some degree of uncertainty in 
it”.38 At a first glance it seems logical to require a physician to also present the patient 
with uncertainties. Even if we only focus on the uncertainty of outcome, a problem the 
doctor faces is the natural variations between patients regarding how their body will 
react to a specific treatment. Uncertainty therefore cannot be avoided.39  
As this highlights, we have moved away from the paternalistic approach taken in Bolam, 
where a physician could quite easily avoid being found liable in negligence, as long as 
she had one supporting expert, to an approach in which the patient is on an equal 
footing with the physician in that she has to be involved in the decisions to be taken, by 
being presented with possible risks and side-effects. So far, so good; but is this really as 
good a development as it seems to be at first sight? 
 
The capable, informed patient 
Now that we have been presented with the reasonable patient, who will make an 
informed decision when confronted with risks and uncertainties we are facing one clear 
problem: who is such a patient? Does she even exist? Even if we acknowledge that there 
are some patients that fit into the ideal mould, it is unlikely that all of them will.  
As Brazier argued a decade ago (and thus before Montgomery), while patients’ rights 
have been neglected for a long time, the balance has since been overcorrected.40 While 
we can presumably all agree that a patient should have the right to refuse a specific 
treatment, the logical extension of the recent legal developments seems to be that a 
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patient now has been given the right to demand any kind of treatment.41 But being a 
patient in need of healthcare does not make us consumers able to demand and choose, 
like ordering from a restaurant menu.  
Through the development of case law the patient has been given so much power that we 
are facing a new problem – the ignorance of the vulnerable situation that the patient 
finds herself in. Even the most capable individual, when faced with decisions about their 
health, becomes vulnerable. Most of us are not medical experts, even at the best of 
times. When we are then faced with decisions about our own health and well-being, it 
becomes difficult to engage with possible risks and uncertainties in an objective way. The 
law therefore has to act in two different ways, safeguarding the autonomy of the 
reasonable patient, while simultaneously protecting the vulnerable one. As O’Neill has 
put it, “[e]ven in the maturity of our faculties we may find it quite taxing to give 
informed consent to complex medical treatment when feeling lousy”.42  
At the same time, some patients might not want to receive all of the available 
information and to be included in the decision making.43 In a small study from 2003, 
regarding the treatment of menopausal symptoms in mid-life women, the authors found 
that many patients are happy to trust their physician and do not want to take 
responsibility for their own treatment.44  
So how do we find out who is who? And what do we do with those that are not capable 
and in the position to reach a sensible decision when faced with all the risks of a 
procedure? The jury is still out on these important questions. 
 
Where do we go from here? 
Ideally, we would need an individual approach, tailored to each patient and taking into 
account their capacity, vulnerability, needs and priorities. As Heywood put it, “it 
becomes essential to allow at least some consideration of that particular patient’s 
position”.45 A treating physician should find out how much information the patient really 
wants and needs, how much she wants to be involved in the decision making. Heywood 
further stated that “[t]he reasonable patient is an abstract conception … There are only 
individual patients”.46 Based on this assumption, and following the development of the 
case law, one would assume that the right approach by physicians is to adapt the level 
of information provided to every patient. What this includes is an adaptation of the 
information given to the assumed understanding of the patient.47 This approach can be 
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seen in Webster, in that the judgment is based on the personal situation of Ms Butler, as 
the need for her to be given more information was supported by her evidence, her 
background and her approach towards her pregnancy.48 This idea is further supported by 
provisions in the guidelines Good Medical Practice by the General Medical Council (GMC), 
which tell doctors that they “must give patients the information they want or need to 
know in a way they can understand … [and] should make sure that arrangements are 
made, wherever possible, to meet patients’ language and communication needs”.49 No 
one can predict what kind of risks a patient is willing to take, what side-effect would 
have which kind of impact on the patient’s life, apart from that patient herself. She is the 
only one who can really evaluate what the right path is for herself, generally, but also in 
the healthcare setting.  
However, this approach seems somewhat unfeasible in today’s world. While the judges 
in Montgomery highlighted the GMC’s guidelines that require doctors to engage in 
conversation with their patients and determine how much and which information is 
wished for and needed,50 the question remains how realistic this requirement is. Due to 
time constraints, there will not always be the time for a doctor to get to know her patient 
to a degree that lets her find out how much information is required by the patient and 
what kind of decisions the doctor should take on her behalf. While the guidelines by the 
GMC state that “[y]ou must listen to patients, take account of their views, and respond 
honestly to their questions”,51 this does not seem to take into account the time pressure 
doctors are facing. Under the NHS, appointments tend to be around ten minutes long,52 
with the British Medical Association asking for an increased appointment length of 15 
minutes.53 As a further complication, in NHS clinics it is not given that a patient will 
always be seen by the same doctor. How then is a doctor supposed to know how much 
information is the right amount for a specific patient? In Webster, Simon LJ stated 
towards the end of the judgment that Ms Butler’s clear evidence, background, and 
“willingness to take responsibility for her pregnancy” support the claim that she required 
and should have received more information than she did by her physician.54 However, 
this is easier to judge in hindsight than it probably is for a physician at the time of 
treatment. Based on an Australian judgment, Rogers v Whitaker,55 which served as the 
basis for the ratio in Montgomery, Heywood suggested that one possible way would be 
to start with the idea of a reasonable patient, establishing how much information this 
hypothetical reasonable patient would require, and then adapting that to the specific 
patient in front of the physician.56 This would also give the patients the opportunity to 
waive their right to be informed and to be involved in the decision making. What this 
requires though, is an open dialogue between patient and physician.57 At the same time 
a patient should not be punished for not asking the right questions.58 The physician thus 
is left in the complicated situation of determining just how much information a specific 
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patient wants and needs. Furthermore, Webster asks for uncertainties to be 
communicated to the patient, which is a vaguer requirement than the request in 
Montgomery, to inform a patient of “any reasonable alternative or variant treatments”.59 
What is left open in Webster, is exactly which uncertainties have to be covered, whether 
it will it be enough to mention that the outcome of treatment has a degree of 
uncertainty, or whether there is a requirement for the uncertainties to be spelled out.  
Determining the correct amount of information required is something the treating 
physician in Webster had failed to achieve, not out of malice, but due to the shortcoming 
that he had not informed himself about the potential risks. And this, undoubtedly, is not 
acceptable. Giving every patient the maximum of information is not the lesson to take 
from this judgment. But what the case law requires is the possibility for the patient to be 
informed of risks and side-effects, if she wishes to receive said information. All we can 
hope for are open minded and engaged physicians with the sensitivity to make a fair and 
reasonable estimate of the information needs of their patients.  
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